We study evolutionary games on graphs. Each player is represented by a vertex of the graph. The edges denote who meets whom. A player can use any one of n strategies. Players obtain a payoff from interaction with all their immediate neighbors. We consider three different update rules, called 'birth-death', 'death-birth' and 'imitation'. A fourth update rule, 'pairwise comparison', is shown to be equivalent to birth-death updating in our model. We use pair approximation to describe the evolutionary game dynamics on regular graphs of degree k. In the limit of weak selection, we can derive a differential equation which describes how the average frequency of each strategy on the graph changes over time. Remarkably, this equation is a replicator equation with a transformed payoff matrix. Therefore, moving a game from a well-mixed population (the complete graph) onto a regular graph simply results in a transformation of the payoff matrix. The new payoff matrix is the sum of the original payoff matrix plus another matrix, which describes the local competition of strategies. We discuss the application of our theory to four particular examples, the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Snow-Drift game, a coordination game and the Rock-Scissors-Paper game. r
Introduction
Consider an evolutionary game with n strategies, labelled i ¼ 1; . . . ; n. The payoff matrix, A, is an n Â n matrix, whose entries, a ij , denote the payoff for strategy i versus strategy j. The relative abundance (frequency) of each strategy is given by x i . We have P n i¼1 x i ¼ 1. The fitness of strategy i is given by f i ¼ P n j¼1 x j a ij . For the average fitness of the population, we obtain f ¼ P n i¼1 x i f i . The replicator equation is given by _ x i ¼ x i ðf i À fÞ; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n.
(
This equation is one of the fundamental equations of evolutionary dynamics. It describes evolutionary game dynamics (frequency dependent selection) in the deterministic limit of an infinitely large, well-mixed population.
Stochasticity and spatial effects are ignored. 'Well-mixed' means that population structure is ignored; all individuals are equally likely to interact with each other. The replicator equation is defined on the simplex S n , which is given by the set of all points ðx 1 ; . . . ; x n Þ with the property P n i¼1 x i ¼ 1. The simplex S n is invariant under replicator dynamics: a trajectory which begins in the simplex never leaves the simplex. Each face of the simplex, defined by one or several strategies being absent, is invariant. The replicator equation describes pure selection dynamics. Mutation is not considered. Each corner point of the simplex is an equilibrium. If a strategy is evolutionarily stable or a strict Nash equilibrium, then the corner point of the simplex corresponding to a homogeneous population using this strategy is an asymptotically stable fixed point. There can be at most one isolated equilibrium point in the interior of the simplex. For nX4, if there is an interior equilibrium, there can also be a limit cycle or a chaotic attractor. Many more properties of this system and the relationship to LotkaVolterra equations of ecology are described in the book by Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) . The replicator equation was introduced by Taylor and Jonker (1978) , followed by Hofbauer et al. (1979) and Zeeman (1980) . Evolutionary game theory was invented by Maynard Smith and Price (1973) and Maynard Smith (1982) . For recent reviews see Hofbauer and Sigmund (2003) and Nowak and Sigmund (2004) . Books on game theory and evolutionary game theory include Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) , Binmore (1994) , Weibull (1995) , Samuelson (1997) , Fudenberg and Levine (1998) , Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) , Gintis (2000) and Cressman (2003) .
In this paper, we study evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations May, 1992, 1993; Ellison, 1993; Herz, 1994; Lindgren and Nordahl, 1994; Nowak et al., 1994; Killingback and Doebeli, 1996; Nakamaru et al., 1997 Nakamaru et al., , 1998 Epstein, 1998; Szabo´and T + oke, 1998; Van Baalen and Rand, 1998; Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Eshel et al., 1999; Hartvigsen et al., 2000; Page et al., 2000; Szabo´et al., 2000; Skyrms and Pemantle, 2000; Abramson and Kuperman, 2001; Hauert, 2001; Irwin and Taylor, 2001; Ebel and Bornholdt, 2002; Hauert et al., 2002; Szabo´and Hauert, 2002; Brandt et al., 2003; Le Galliard et al., 2003; Hauert and Szabo´, 2003; Hauert and Doebeli, 2004; Ifti et al., 2004; Szabo´and Vukov, 2004; Szolnoki and Szabo´, 2004; Eguı´luz et al., 2005; Hauert and Szabo´, 2005; Nakamaru and Iwasa, 2005; Santos and Pacheco, 2005; Vukov and Szabo´, 2005; Santos et al., 2006a, b) . The individuals occupy the vertices of a graph; the edges of the graph determine which individuals interact with each other (Lieberman et al., 2005; . We consider n strategies and the general payoff matrix A ¼ ½a ij . Each individual derives a payoff, P, from the interaction with all of its neighbors in the graph. The fitness of an individual is given by 1 À w þ wP, where the parameter w determines the intensity of selection. The case w ! 0 represents the limit of weak selection, while w ¼ 1 denotes strong selection, where fitness equals payoff. Strong selection is a special case, because in general the fitness of an individual will not only depend on the particular game that is under consideration, but on many different factors . Therefore, introducing a parameter for varying the intensity of selection is an important step, which was never taken in the traditional framework of the replicator equation, because there w cancels out.
In games on graphs, the fitness of an individual is locally determined from interactions with all adjacent individuals. The traditional replicator equation (1) describes the special case of a 'complete graph', where all vertices are connected to each other and hence all individuals are adjacent.
We consider three different update rules for the evolutionary dynamics (Figs. 1a-c) , which we call 'birthdeath' (BD), 'death-birth' (DB) and 'imitation' (IM). (i) For BD updating, an individual is selected for reproduction from the entire population proportional to fitness; the offspring of this individual replaces a randomly chosen neighbor.
(ii) For DB updating, a random individual from the entire population is chosen to die; the neighbors compete for the empty site proportional to fitness. (iii) For IM updating, a random individual from the entire population is chosen to revise its strategy; it will either keep its current strategy or imitate one of the neighbors' strategies proportional to fitness. Note that our IM updating is different from the 'imitation dynamics' introduced by Weibull (1995) and Hofbauer and Sigmund (2003) , which describe deterministic game dynamics in a well-mixed population, where random pairs of players compare their payoffs and possibly imitate the strategy of the other.
These three update rules define three slightly different stochastic processes. In each process, one elementary step involves two random choices, one of them is proportional to fitness. For BD updating the first choice is proportional to fitness, for DB and IM updating the second choice is proportional to fitness. We will find that this detail can introduce interesting differences.
In the Appendix, we also consider a fourth update rule called 'pairwise comparison' (PC) (Fig. 1d) . Here one player is chosen at random, then one of its neighbors is chosen. The first individual will adopt the strategy of the second individual with a probability that is given by 1=½1 þ expðÀw DPÞ where the payoff difference is DP ¼ P 2 À P 1 . Interestingly, this update rule leads to the same behavior as BD updating in our current analysis. Therefore, we do not need to consider it as an additional case.
Games on graphs are stochastic, while the replicator equation is deterministic. Recently Traulsen et al. (2005 Traulsen et al. ( , 2006a have found that the Moran process in a well-mixed population leads to the deterministic equation that is called adjusted replicator dynamics. What we want to do in this paper is to derive a system of ordinary differential equations that describes how the expected frequency of each strategy in a game on a graph changes over time. We will use pair approximation (Matsuda et al., 1987 (Matsuda et al., , 1992 Van Baalen, 2000) on regular graphs of degree k . This means each individual is connected to k other individuals. Strictly speaking pair approximation is formulated for infinitely large Bethe lattices (or Caily trees) which have no loops and no leaves. It is well known, however, that pair approximation gives good results for random regular graphs; as the number of vertices, N, increases the probability of short loops becomes negligible. As we will point out below our calculation requires k42. For an analysis of k ¼ 2 see .
Let us introduce the n Â n matrix B ¼ ½b ij for the three different update mechanisms as follows:
Let us further introduce the quantities
If x i ðtÞ is the expected frequency of strategy i on an infinitely large graph of degree k at time t, then our pairapproximation calculation in the limit of weak selection leads to the surprisingly simple equation
We propose to call this equation the 'replicator equation on graphs'. It describes how the expected frequencies of strategies on a graph of degree k42 change over time. The simplicity and symmetry of this equation is remarkable given the complexity of the underlying stochastic process that describes games on graphs.
The term f i ¼ P n j¼1 x j a ij denotes the average fitness of strategy i, as in the replicator equation, and comes from well-mixed interactions among all strategies. The additional term, g i , characterizes the local competition among strategies. Note that the population average of the local competition term sums to zero,
Therefore the average fitness of the population, f ¼ P n i¼1 x i ðf i þ g i Þ ¼ P n i¼1 x i f i , remains the same as in the replicator equation.
As seen in Eqs. (2), the term for local competition, b ij , includes the payoff that strategy i gets from strategy i plus the payoff that strategy i gets from strategy j minus the payoff that j gets from i minus the payoff that j gets from j. The diagonal terms, a ii and a jj , characterize the effect of assortativeness, while the off-diagonal terms, a ij and a ji , characterize the effect of spite. Note that the matrix ðb ij Þ is antisymmetric, i.e. b ij ¼ Àb ji . This makes sense, because the gain of one strategy in local competitiveness is the loss of another. In particular, the diagonal terms b ii are always zero, suggesting that the payoff for one strategy playing against others using the same strategy will always be the same irrespective of population structure.
In a structured population, it is especially important which payoff players get when interacting with another player who uses the same strategy (assortativeness) and also which payoff strategies provide to others with whom they are in direct competition (spite). As in Eqs. (2), for BD updating the contributions from assortativeness and spite is equally strong, while for DB updating assortativeness is stronger than spite (the coefficients for assortativeness in Eqs. (2) have relative weight k þ 1). IM updating has a balance of assortativeness and spite that is somewhere between BD and DB updating. For a zero sum game, which can be defined by a ii ¼ 0 and a ij ¼ Àa ji for all i and j, we find that b ij is equal to a ij times a constant. Therefore, the graph has no consequence for the evolutionary dynamics (other than affecting the time scale). For pair approximation and weak selection, a zero sum game on a regular graph has the same evolutionary dynamics as in a well-mixed population.
Observe also as k increases the relative contribution of g i compared to f i decreases. In the limit k ! 1, Eq. (4) leads back to Eq. (1), the replicator equation on a highly connected graph converges to the normal replicator equation, which agrees with the result by Traulsen et al. (2006a) for weak selection.
Finally, we note that the replicator equation on graphs can also be written in the form
Therefore, moving evolutionary game dynamics from a well-mixed population (the complete graph) onto a regular graph of degree k is simply described by a transformation of the payoff matrix
Our results will be derived for degree homogeneous (regular) graphs and weak selection, but we expect that the replicator equation on graphs is also a good approximation for many games on non-regular graphs and for higher intensity of selection. In any case, an exact understanding of the limiting scenario is a good point of departure for investigations of more complicated and more specific scenarios.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sections 2-4, we will show the pair-approximation calculations for BD, DB and IM updating, respectively. In Section 5, we will study the Prisoner's Dilemma, and in Section 6 the Snow-Drift game, where we investigate the effect of spatiality on the evolution of cooperation. In Section 7 we will study a coordination game to see the possibility whether local population structure favors efficient outcomes for groups through individual selection. In Section 8 we will study the Rock-Scissors-Paper game to investigate spatial effect on evolutionary cycles. Section 9 contains conclusions. There is a short Appendix showing the equivalence between PC and BD updating.
Birth-death updating
For BD updating, a player is chosen for reproduction from the entire population proportional to fitness. The offspring of this player replaces a random neighbor. In this section, we will derive the replicator equation for games on graphs with BD updating, assuming weak selection w51.
In a well-mixed population, the probability that a player meets an i-strategist is equal to its global frequency, x i . For games on graphs, however, this is not necessarily true. Since dispersal is limited, those who use the same strategy tend to form clusters. Therefore, we have to take into account the correlation in strategies of two adjacent players.
Let q ijj be the conditional probability that the focal player uses strategy i given that an adjacent player uses strategy j. In other words, q ijj is the local frequency of strategy i around strategy j. The local frequency q ijj is expressed by the global frequencies of strategies as q ijj ¼ x ij =x j . Here x ij denotes the global pair frequency of i-j pairs.
Similarly one can imagine more detailed local frequencies such as q ijjl , which represents the conditional probability that the focal player uses strategy i given that an adjacent player uses strategy j and that a two-step adjacent player uses strategy l. For analytical tractability, we will adopt the pair approximation method (Matsuda et al., 1987 (Matsuda et al., , 1992 Van Baalen, 2000) , which assumes q ijjl ¼ q ijj . The crucial assumption is that a two-step adjacent player does not affect the focal site directly.
We are interested in the dynamics of global and local frequencies. Because we consider weak selection, global frequencies change at a rate of order w, which is very slow. Local frequencies change at a rate of order 1. Therefore, we have a separation of two time scales.
Let us first derive local frequencies at equilibrium. While local frequencies equilibrate, we can regard global frequencies as constant. Suppose that a player is chosen for reproduction on average once per unit time. Then the dynamics of local frequencies are calculated as follows:
Here d ij is the Kronecker delta; (8) and by using the identity q ijj x j ¼ q jji x i equilibrium local frequencies are calculated as
We see that q Ã iji 4x i 4q Ã ijj ðjaiÞ holds. Players using strategy i have more i-neighbors than is expected by the global frequency, while players using another strategy have less i-neighbors than is expected.
Given these local frequencies, we can derive the dynamics of global frequencies. For convenience we rewrite q Ã ijj as q ijj . We invent the term 'ði; k 1 ; . . . ; k n Þ-player' denoting a player using strategy i who has k 1 neighbors with strategy 1; . . . ; and k n neighbors with strategy n.
Let us now consider one elementary step of BD updating.
The number of i-strategists increases by one, when (i) an ði; k 1 ; . . . ; k n Þ-player is chosen for reproduction and (ii) the offspring replaces a neighbor who does not use strategy i. The first event occurs with probability
Here W ði;k 1 ;...;k n Þ denotes the fitness of an ði; k 1 ; . . . ; k n Þ-player, which is given by
W is the average fitness in the population. The second event occurs with probability 1 À ðk i =kÞ.
In contrast, the number of i-strategists decreases by one when (i) an ðj; k 1 ; . . . ; k n Þ-player ðjaiÞ is chosen for reproduction and (ii) the offspring replaces an i-player. The first event occurs with probability
The second event occurs with probability k i =k.
From these calculations we obtain the expected increment of the frequency of strategy i, denoted by E½Dx i , in one elementary step of updating, which takes time Dt. In infinite populations stochasticity resulting from random sampling vanishes and the quantity E½Dx i =Dt becomes equal to _ x i . Thus we obtain the deterministic evolutionary dynamics
We have
Neglecting the constant factor, wðk À 2Þ 2 =ðk À 1Þ, which is equivalent to a change of time scale, gives us the replicator equation on graphs,
Death-birth updating
For DB updating, a random player is chosen from the entire population to die. Then the neighbors compete for the vacancy proportional to their fitness. Again, we will derive the replicator equation for games on graphs using DB updating and assuming weak selection w51.
First we derive the steady state of the local frequencies. Direct calculation shows that the dynamics of local frequencies are exactly the same as Eq. (8). Hence, the local frequencies converge to
Next we study the dynamics of global frequencies. Let us consider one elementary step of DB updating.
The number of i-strategists increases by one when (i) an ðj; k 1 ; . . . ; k n Þ-player ðjaiÞ dies and (ii) one of its ineighbors wins the competition for the vacancy. The first event occurs with probability
The second event occurs with probability
Here W ijj represents the fitness of an i-player one of whose neighbors is j-player, given as
In contrast, the number of i-strategists decreases by one, when (i) an ði; k 1 ; . . . ; k n Þ-player dies and (ii) one of its neighbors not using strategy i wins the competition for the vacancy. The first event occurs with probability
From these calculations we obtain
Again, neglecting the constant factor yields the replicator equation on graphs,
Imitation (IM) updating
For IM updating, a random player is chosen for updating his strategy from the entire population. Then he will either keep his current strategy or imitate one of the neighbors' strategies proportional to fitness. As before, we assume weak selection w51.
First we derive the steady state of local frequencies, regarding global frequencies as constant. Direct calculation leads to
From this, we obtain the steady state of local frequencies as
As before, let us derive the dynamics of x i . Consider an elementary step of IM updating. The number of i-strategists increases by one when (i) an ðj; k 1 ; . . . ; k n Þ-player ðjaiÞ is chosen for updating and (ii) he imitates one of his i-neighbors. The first event occurs with probability
The number of i-strategists decreases by one, when (i) an ði; k 1 ; . . . ; k n Þ-player is chosen for updating and (ii) he imitates one of his neighbors not using strategy i. The first event occurs with probability
Neglecting the constant factor yields the replicator equation for games on graphs using IM updating,
The Prisoner's Dilemma
Consider a Prisoner's Dilemma game (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Trivers, 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981) . A cooperator pays a cost c for his opponent to receive a benefit b. We assume b4c. A defector pays nothing. The payoff matrix of this game is given by
Defection, D, dominates cooperation, C. Defection is a strict Nash equilibrium. The traditional replicator equation of a well-mixed population is given by
Here x represents the frequency (relative abundance) of cooperators in the population. Eq. (35) has two fixed points: (i) at x ¼ 1 there is an unstable equilibrium where everybody cooperates; at x ¼ 0 there is a stable equilibrium where everybody defects. Therefore x ¼ 0 is the global attractor of these dynamics. Hence, evolutionary game theory predicts the victory of defectors in well-mixed populations.
The game dynamics can drastically change if we consider a structured population. The replicator equation of the Prisoner's Dilemma on a graph of degree k for the three different update rules is given by
For BD updating, defectors always win over cooperators as in well-mixed populations. For DB updating, however, if b=c4k, then cooperators win over defectors. Similarly, for IM updating, cooperators win over defectors if b=c4k þ 2. We note that these conditions are identical to those derived by , when analyzing the fixation probabilities of cooperators and defectors on graphs. For DB updating, natural selection favors cooperators over defectors if the benefit-to-cost ratio of the altruistic act exceeds the degree of the graph, k (which denotes the number of neighbors of any one individual). Smaller connectivity, k, favors cooperators because then clustering is easier. Interestingly, observe that the conditions b=c4k and b=c4k þ 2 also hold in numerical simulations of the Prisoner's Dilemma on degree heterogeneous (non-regular graphs) such as random graphs and scale free networks. In this case, the parameter k denotes the average number of neighbors per individual. Therefore, we conjecture that the replicator equation on graphs (Eq. (4)) will also extend to many non-regular graphs, but we cannot prove this at present. DB and IM updating can also predict a couple of interesting phenomena for the general Prisoner's Dilemma game given by the payoff matrix
The game is a Prisoner's Dilemma if T4R4P4S. As a specific example, let us consider
If this game is played on a graph with degree k ¼ 3, then the corresponding replicator dynamics for DB updating is given by
There is a stable equilibrium at x Ã ¼ 1 2 . Therefore, in this example, unconditional cooperators and defectors can coexist.
As another example consider the Prisoner's Dilemma given by the payoff matrix
The replicator equation of this game for DB updating and weak selection on a regular graph with k ¼ 3 is given by
There is an unstable equilibrium at x Ã ¼ 5 7 . Hence, the system exhibits bistability between cooperation and defection.
The Snow-Drift game
Consider a Snow-Drift game. Two drivers are trapped on either side of a snow-drift in a blizzard. Cooperation means to get out of the car and shovel. Defection means to relax, remain in the car and let the other one do the work. If either one of them cooperates, then both gain the benefit of getting home, b. The cost of removing the snow-drift is c. If both drivers shovel (cooperate), then the cost for each of them is c=2. It is assumed that b4c. The payoff matrix of this game is given by
Let x denote the frequency of cooperators. The traditional replicator equation describing a well-mixed population leads to stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors atx ¼ 1 À r, where r ¼ c=ð2b À cÞ.
For DB and IM updating on a regular graph of degree kX3, we find that the equilibrium frequency of cooperators, x Ã , is always greater thanx. Furthermore, we find that x Ã ¼ 1 if b=c4ðk 2 þ 1Þ=ð2k þ 2Þ for DB updating and if b=c4ðk 2 þ 2k þ 3Þ=ð2k þ 6Þ for IM updating. Therefore, spatial effects (graph selection) always favor cooperators for these two update rules.
For BD updating, we find that the equilibrium frequency of cooperators is greater than in the well-mixed case, x Ã 4x, if b=c4 3 2 . Remarkably, this condition does not depend on the degree of the graph (but remember that all our results are derived for kX3). In addition, for BD updating some parameter choices lead to dominance of one strategy over the other. If b=c4ðk þ 1Þ=2 then x Ã ¼ 1, which means that defectors become extinct. If b=coð2k À 1Þ= ð2k À 2Þ then x Ã ¼ 0, which means that cooperators become extinct. Hauert and Doebeli (2004) have studied the effect of spatial structure on the snow-drift game. One of their update rules is equivalent to our PC updating and therefore similar to BD updating in our analysis (see Appendix). Based on numerical simulations, Hauert and Doebeli (2004) make the interesting observation that spatial structure can inhibit cooperation in the snow-drift game. This finding is in qualitative agreement with our result for BD updating: if b=co 3 2 then the equilibrium frequency of cooperators on a regular graph of (small) degree k is less than the equilibrium frequency of cooperators in a wellmixed population. A quantitative comparison is difficult, however, because Hauert and Doebeli did not study the case of weak selection. Our prediction is that for weak selection and DB or IM updating, spatial structure always favors cooperators in the snow-drift game.
Pareto-efficiency versus risk dominance in a coordination game
Consider the payoff matrix
If a4c and d4b then both strategies A and B are strict Nash equilibria. In this case, the game is called a 'coordination game'. It is best to do the same as the opponent; hence, both players want to coordinate their actions. But should they play A or B? If a þ boc þ d, then strategy B is called risk-dominant (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) . In the standard replicator equation describing a well-mixed population, the basin of attraction of B is then greater than 1 2 . It could be, however, that a4d, in which case strategy A is called pareto-efficient. For both players, the best outcome is that both choose strategy A, but the risk of receiving a low payoff is minimized by choosing strategy B. This is an interesting dilemma. How does population structure affect the evolutionary dynamics of such a game?
Let us consider the specific coordination game given by the payoff matrix 
Let us assume that the parameter a satisfies 1oao3. Therefore, both strategies A and B are strict Nash equilibria, but B is always risk dominant over A. If ao2 then B is both risk-dominant and pareto-efficient. If, however, a42 then an interesting conflict arises, because strategy A is pareto-efficient, while strategy B is riskdominant. First we study the replicator dynamics of this game in a well-mixed population. Let x denote the frequency of strategy A. There is an unstable equilibrium at x Ã ¼ 2=ð1 þ aÞ. As illustrated in Fig. 2a , the system is bistable: if the initial fraction of A is greater than x Ã , then strategy A will take over the whole population; if the initial fraction of A is less than x Ã , then strategy B will take over the whole population. As we see in Fig. 2a , strategy B always has the larger basin of attraction.
Let us now consider this coordination game on a graph. For BD updating, the basin of attraction of strategy B is always larger than in a well-mixed population. Therefore, BD updating favors risk dominance. For DB updating, if a4ð3k þ 1Þ=ðk þ 1Þ then strategy A has the larger basin of attraction. For IM updating, the equivalent condition is a4ð3k þ 7Þ=ðk þ 3Þ. Since kX3 both conditions imply that a42, which means that A is pareto-efficient. Therefore, DB and IM updating of game dynamics on graphs can favor pareto-efficiency over risk dominance (Fig. 2) . See for similar results on the cycle ðk ¼ 2Þ.
The Rock-Scissors-Paper game
Let us consider the Rock-Scissors-Paper game (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) . This game has three pure strategies, R 1 , R 2 and R 3 . In a pairwise matching, R 1 is defeated by R 2 , R 2 is defeated by R 3 , and R 3 is defeated by R 1 . As an example, we study the Rock-Scissors-Paper game with the payoff matrix Fig. 3a shows the phase portrait of the replicator equation of this game in a well-mixed population. Each vertex of the simplex is an unstable equilibrium corresponding to a monomorphic population. There is an unstable equilibrium in the interior of the simplex. The Jacobian matrix at this internal equilibrium has three eigenvalues, one of them is associated with the transversal direction for the simplex S 3 and is of no consequence. The other two eigenvalues form a pair of complex conjugates and determine the stability of the equilibrium. For matrix (45), the real part of those two eigenvalues is given by Re½l ¼ 1 28 40. The fact that this quantity is positive implies that the internal equilibrium is unstable. All orbits starting from the interior of the simplex ultimately converge to the heteroclinic cycle at the boundary, which consists of three edges, e 1 ! e 2 , e 2 ! e 3 and e 3 ! e 1 . There are oscillations of increasing amplitude, which will eventually result in the extinction of two of the three strategies (see May and Leonard, 1975) .
Playing the Rock-Scissors-Paper game on a graph not only changes the position of the internal equilibrium, but can also affect its stability. Figs. 3b-d 
For DB and IM updating, this suggests that the internal equilibrium is stable and hence is the global attractor of the dynamics. We observe that DB updating stabilizes the internal equilibrium more than IM updating. In contrast, BD updating does not change the stability of the internal equilibrium in this example.
Discussion
Evolutionary game dynamics in a well-mixed population can be described by the replicator equation,
Here x i denotes the frequency of strategy i, the quantities a ij denote the payoff for strategy i versus strategy j and f ¼ P ij a ij x i x j is the average payoff in the population. Evolutionary game dynamics on a regular graph of degree k in the limit of weak selection ðw51Þ can be described by the 'replicator equation on graphs',
For the three different update rules, BD, DB and IM, the coefficients of the B matrix are given by
Therefore, moving a game from a well-mixed population onto a regular graph preserves the structure of the ARTICLE IN PRESS 
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Appendix. Pairwise comparison (PC) updating
For PC updating, a random individual is chosen for updating its strategy. Then it chooses a random neighbor. The first player adopts the neighbor's strategy with probability 1=ð1 þ exp½Àw DPÞ where the payoff difference is DP ¼ P 2 À P 1 . Here w works as inverse temperature in statistical physics (Szabo´and T + oke, 1998; Hauert and Szabo´, 2005; Traulsen et al., 2006b, c) . Unlike the three updating rules in the main text, w can be any non-negative real number here. As w ! 1, PC updating becomes deterministic: an updating player always imitates the neighbor with a higher payoff but never imitates the neighbor with a lower score. This is called imitate the better rule (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003) . In contrast, here we assume weak selection w51.
First we derive the steady state of local frequencies, regarding global frequencies as constant. We obtain From this, we obtain
Let us derive the dynamics of x i . Consider one elementary step of PC updating. The number of istrategists increases by one, when a j-player is chosen for adopting the strategy of an i-neighbor (where jai). This event occurs with probability Fig. 3 . The replicator dynamics of the Rock-Scissors-Paper game (Eq. (45) for a well-mixed population (a), or played on graphs with degree k ¼ 3 for BD, DB and IM updating (b-d) . Each panel shows the simplex S 3 . Each corner point, e i , corresponds to the monomorphic population where only strategy R i is present. Open and solid circles in figures represent unstable and stable equilibria, respectively. For the well-mixed population (a) and for BD updating (b), the internal equilibrium is unstable; all orbits converge to the heteroclinic cycle at the boundary. But for DB updating (c) and IM updating (d), the internal equilibrium is stable and becomes the global attractor of the dynamics.
On the other hand, the number of i-strategists decreases by one, when an i-player is chosen to adopt the strategy of a j neighbor (where jai). This event occurs with probability We have
x i x j a ij ,
Neglecting the constant factor yields the replicator equation for games on graphs,
Note that this equation is exactly the same as for BD updating.
